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Security in sensor networks is one of the most relevant research topics in resource constrained wireless devices and networks.
Several attacks can be suﬀered in ad hoc and wireless sensor networks (WSN), which are highly susceptible to attacks, due to the
limited resources of the nodes. In this paper, we propose innovative and lightweight localization techniques that allow for intrusion
identification and isolation schemes and provide accurate location information. This information is used by our routing protocol
which additionally incorporates a distributed trust model to prevent several routing attacks to the network. We finally evaluate our
algorithms for accurate localization and for secure routing which have been implemented and tested in real ad hoc and wireless
sensor networks.
1. Introduction
Security in sensor networks is one of the most relevant
research topics in resource-constrained wireless devices and
networks. Many security issues arise from the nature of such
networks: nodes are severely limited in key capabilities (such
as, transmission power and computing resources), and they
operate in an ad hoc mode, requiring the cooperation of
other devices to route data packets to their destination. Thus,
deploying ad hoc and wireless sensor networks (WSN) in a
hostile environment is a challenging task that usually requires
the use of diﬀerent combined techniques at various network
levels.
Intruder identification in an ad hoc network is defined
as the procedure of identifying the user or host that
conducts inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activities
that threaten the connectivity or reliability of the network
or the authenticity of the data traﬃc flowing through it.
Intruder identification is, thus, triggered when the ad hoc
network is aware of an attack so as to trace back to the
source of the attack. The identification of an intruder should
be followed by an isolation procedure that prevents that
node to communicate with any other node in the network.
Intruders may misbehave maliciously either regarding lower
or higher communication layers and can thus be detected
either by lower layer schemes (e.g., secure routing protocols)
or application layer mechanisms.
In the framework of the FP7-AWISSENET project [1],
we have designed and validated a security tool box that eﬃ-
ciently defends against an important subset of the identified
attacks. In the paper, we present 2 main innovations, which
work cooperatively to respond to attacks in the wireless
network: a lightweight solution for accurate localization
information based on range-free techniques (for radio access
networks where only the RSSI information is available), and
an innovative trust-aware routing approach called Ambient
Trust Secure Routing (ATSR) protocol which is based
on the geographical routing principle and incorporates a
distributed trust model to defend against routing attacks.
Accurate localization information is necessary both for appli-
cation layer Intrusion Detection Systems (to identify/locate
the intruders) and for secure routing since the proposed
2 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
location-based routing requires trustable localization infor-
mation. It is worth pointing out that a geographical routing
approach has been adopted to eﬃciently cope with the large
network dimensions of current and emerging WSNs.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 is
presenting the general architecture of the wireless networks
structure we used for our research and where we tested our
solutions. Section 3 is devoted to the accurate localization
techniques and algorithms description for range-free tech-
niques, and for robust range-based positioning. In Section 4
we describe the geographical secure routing protocol. In
Section 5 we evaluate the algorithms and protocols devel-
oped for the wireless networks described in Section 2 based
on results from simulation but also experimental work on
our real-life test-bed. We end the paper with the conclusions,
acknowledgement and references.
2. Security Attacks Tackled and
General Framework
A great variety of attacks has been described in the literature
on security on ad hoc and wireless sensor networks [2]
targeting the diﬀerent networking operations. The long list
of routing attacks [3] includes both easily implementable
attacks and more sophisticated attacks. Black/grey-hole
attacks (where a malicious node drops all or part of the
received traﬃc) and modification attacks (where a malicious
node modifies all or part of the forwarded messages so that
the included data are no longer valid) are quite common.
On the other hand, a node may falsify the state machine of
the routing protocol by replaying stale routing information
(replaying attack) or by advertising high quality links to the
destination to attract the traﬃc and then forward it to a
colluding adversary node. The first attack category can be
eﬃciently mitigated by implementing a trust management
system: each node monitors the behaviour of its neighbours
before cooperating with it. The second category can be
detected by intrusion detection systems (IDSs) which can be
implemented on a subset of the network nodes since it is
associated with higher processing and energy requirements.
It is stressed that Intrusion Detection Systems are capable
of detecting attacks addressing all networking protocols (not
only routing) depending on the implemented rules.
The implementation of localization techniques assists in
the identification of intruders by intrusion detection systems
that mainly target the mitigation of more sophisticated and
aggressive attacks addressing the communications protocol
state machine. Most intruder identification and isolation
schemes which are based on monitoring the network traﬃc
and are lacking localization tools are only eﬀective against
a limited subset of attacks like denial of service. On the
contrary, the detection of more aggressive attacks like the
case of the black-hole intruder (which is trying to deceive the
network operation by advertising that it has a fake shortest
route to the destination node) or of a wormhole attack
(where twomalicious nodes create a tunnel to divert network
traﬃc through a private link) requires the implementation
of localization tools. In such cases, the possibility of getting
information about the position of the network nodes allows
a monitoring system to detect inconsistencies between the
logical topology of the network and the physical situation of
the nodes and then triggers the proper networking actions.
Coming to the routing operation, in our attempt to
design a secure routing protocol suitable for large WSNs to
meet the market trends for high WSN penetrations, we have
opted for a location-based routing protocol. In geographical
(i.e., location-based) routing, each node sends its data packet
to the neighbour that is closest to the destination for further
forwarding. Location-based routing relies on the assumption
that each node announces its location in the so-called Beacon
message. This requires the existence of GPS equipment
on every node, which is a rather costly solution, or the
implementation of localization techniques. However, the fact
that each node announces its coordinates allows for Sybil
attacks: a malicious node may announce a false location
(possibly close to the data sink) to attract the traﬃc and
then drop it or process it. The only way to overcome this
drawback of geographical routing is to design and implement
localization techniques which allow the network nodes to
calculate the position of their neighbours and compare it
with the one announced in the messages, so that malicious
nodes are excluded from any network cooperation.
The proposed secure routing protocol incorporates a
distributed trust model which is capable of defending black
and grey-hole attacks, modification attacks, as well as attacks
targeting the trust model itself (e.g., bad-mouthing attack)
based on both direct and indirect trust information as will
be detailed in Section 4. It additionally takes into account
the remaining energy level of each neighbour so as to
perform load balancing and better manage the overall energy
resources.
3. Robust Localization for Geographic Routing
3.1. Introduction. Localization techniques for WSNs can be
broadly classified into two main categories: range-based and
range-free. Range-based approaches assume the availability
of accurate measurements directly related to the distances
and/or the relative angles between pairs of network nodes.
On the other hand, range-free methods only use parameters
readily available at the PHY layer level that are only loosely
related to the position of the node.
Although there are diﬀerent magnitudes that can be
related to the distance between two nodes that establish
a radio link, two of them are especially useful in WSNs:
received signal strength (RSS) and signal time-of-arrival
(TOA). However, while RSS-related measurements are easy
to obtain in standard oﬀ-the-shelf IEEE 802.15.4 devices,
attaining values of TOA require, either attaching to them
some special purpose hardware (such as, ultrasonic trans-
ducers) or resorting to diﬀerent radio interfaces (such
as, those described in the IEEE 802.15.4a standard) that
would make new devices incompatible at the PHY level
with legacy ones. We will, thus, concentrate our attention
in techniques that use RSS measurements as the base to
achieve localization, either using range-based or range-free
approaches.
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From the point of view of positioning, two network
topologies can be defined: single-hop localization, when all
the nodes to be located can independently obtain their loca-
tions [4, 5], and multihop or cooperative localization, when
unlocated nodes, have do not enough position references and
so they have to exchange information between them and
consider the localization of the whole network as a global
optimization task [6].
Among the range-free approaches found in the literature,
some of them try to achieve localization based on simple
variables such as, connectivity [7] or hop-count [8], while
others use more informative parameters related to signal
angle-of-arrival (AOA) [9] or received power [10, 11].
Most of the latter range-free approaches use the so-called
received signal strength indicator (RSSI), which is a coarsely
quantized value of RSS that can be retrieved from the PHY in
most commercial sensor nodes.
We want to remark here that, although there are a
number of proposed techniques for range-free techniques,
unfortunately only a few of them have been reportedly
implemented on real devices and have shown satisfactory
performance in realistic environments. This fact makes
almost impossible to establish a fair comparison between
diﬀerent approaches. We also miss in the related literature an
assessment of both range-based and range-free approaches
under a common simulation framework.
In this paper we will consider only single-hop localization
techniques. So, to perform the localization process, we will
assume that an unknown-position node (UN) is always in the
neighbourhood of a suﬃcient number of anchor nodes (AN)
whose positions are known and act as location references. In
the sequel we will use the following notation.
(i) u = (x, y) is the position in the plane of the UN.
(ii) ai = (xi, yi) is the position of the ith AN, where i =
1, 2, . . . ,N .
(iii) d(p,q) ≡ ‖p − q‖ is the Euclidean distance between
two arbitrary network nodes at positions p and q.
(iv) ρ(p,q) is the RSS in dBm measured at the receiver of
node q for a signal transmitted by node p.
3.2. Range-Based Positioning. In range-based localization, we
assume that there exists a measurement equation, derived
from a radio propagation model, which relates distances and














where ρ0 is the mean received power (in dBm) at a reference
distance d0 (typically 1m), α is the path-loss exponent
(which depends on the environment), and e is the measure-
ment error (represented as a zero-mean Gaussian random
variable). Therefore, the additive error in logarithmic scale
(dBs) aﬀects distance measurements as a multiplicative
random variable (log-normal shadowing).
Now, given N ANs located at known points {ai, i =
1, 2, . . . ,N} in the neighbourhood of the UN u, which
can collect independent RSS measurements {ρ(ai,u), i =
1, 2, . . . ,N} for packets sent by the ANs, the maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) of the node position can be












d(ai,u) = ‖ai − u‖ =
√




i = 1, 2, . . . ,N.
(3)
Finding the global solution of (2) is a diﬃcult nonlinear
optimization problem because of the existence of local
minima, so that we will try to find simpler alternatives.
For instance, using (1) we can obtain an estimation of the




) = d010[ρ0−ρ(p,q)]/10α, (4)
so that we can establish the following overdetermined set of
nonlinear equations:
d(ai,u) = d010[ρ0−ρ(ai,u)]/10α, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N , (5)
where {d(ai,u), i = 1, 2, . . . ,N} are defined in (3). A
suboptimal solution of (5) can be obtained if we square and
change signs, and then define the new auxiliary variables
R2 = x2 + y2, R2i = x2i + y2i , i = 1, 2, . . . ,N (6)
because the resulting system of equations
2xix + 2yi y − R2 = R2i − d2010[ρ0−ρ(ai,u)]/5α, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N
(7)
is linear in the unknowns x, y, and R2, and thus can be
rewritten in vector-matrix form as
Az = b, (8)







































Now, the least squares (LS) solution to the overdetermined
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which gives the estimated position (x̂, ŷ) of the node as the
first and second components of vector ẑLS.
Notice that the value of ρ0 depends on parameters such
as, the transmitted power, antenna gain and orientation, and
attenuations owing to diﬀerent elements in the signal path,
which are quite diﬃcult to precisely control. So, unless we
have a mechanism to perform periodic calibrations of the
RSS measurements, and we ensure that the experimental
conditions remain stable in time, we will often have to deal
with situations in which distances can only be estimated from




) = G10−ρ(p,q)/10α, (11)
where the constant G should also be estimated from the
measurements as a “nuisance” parameter. In this case,
the localization protocol should be reversed: anchor nodes
obtain RSS values {ρ(u, ai), i = 1, 2, . . . ,N} for packets sent
by the UN, and then send those measurements back to the
node (or to a central processor) to estimate the UN position.
So, now the system (8) can be reformulated with an extended
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Notice that a data-fusion process is implicit in (10), because
all the available measurements are combined to achieve the
localization of the node.
3.3. Range-Free Techniques. Range-free methods do not rely
on the existence of a measurement model. Instead, many
of these methods assume a simple monotonicity constraint:









)⇐⇒ d(p,q) < d(p, r). (13)
Notice that, because the transmitted power is assumed
unknown, RSSI measurements are not expected to be
symmetric, that is, ρ(p,q) /= ρ(q,p). One of the simplest
approaches to the solution of the problem of localizing a
node based on the restriction (13) is given by the so-called
ROCRSSI algorithm [11], which we briefly outline below.
If we assume the unlocated node u is surrounded by N
anchors then, for every anchor ai(i = 1, 2, . . . ,N) in the
neighbourhood of u, we will assume that the following RSSI
values are available:
One anchor to node RSSI: ρ(ai,u),
N−1 anchor to anchor RSSIs: ρ(ai, a j) for all j /= i.
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(14)
and we compare the anchor to node RSSI with the sorted










where k ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,N − 1}, then, the monotonicity
constraint (13) implies that the UN lies on a ring centred











The special cases ρ(ai,u) > ρ(ai, a(1)) and ρ(ai,u) <
ρ(ai, a(N−1)) should be treated separately: the first one implies
that u belongs to the disk d(ai,u) < d(ai, a(1)), while in the
second case we can either assume that the node lies in the
exterior of a circle d(ai,u) > d(ai, a(N−1)) or, as suggested in
[11], simply discard the measurement to avoid unbounded
regions. After repeating the following procedure for all the
anchors, the UN is found to be located on the intersection of
the rings defined by (16). Then, the final position of the UN
is estimated as the centroid of such intersection region.
With actual measurements, the condition (13) does not
hold for every pair of nodes because the radio channel
is usually anisotropic, so that not all the rings (16) have
a common intersection. The compromise solution in such
cases is to assume the UN to be in the region of the plane
wheremost of the rings intersect. This is equivalent to assume
that every anchor “votes” for a given ring as a candidate to
hold the UN, and the region of the plane that gets the higher
number of votes is finally elected. Such voting strategy has
the added benefit of providing a good degree of robustness
to some kinds of attacks to the localization process, as we
will see in Section 3.4. A simple, yet computationally costly,
implementation of the voting approach is given by the grid-
scan algorithm [10].
Another important fact to be taken into account is that
shadowing eﬀects make the variance of RSS measurements
to increase with distance [6]. In our context, it means that
the RSSI values obtained from ANs that are far away from
the node are suﬀering from large errors and can be excluded
from the localization process. For this reason, we propose a
modification of the original ROCRSSI technique which we
call “best anchors selection” (BAS)
The BAS method first fixes a maximum number or rings
for each AN that can be considered as “reliable”, in the sense
that RSSI measurements at nodes placed within those rings
have relatively low variance. Such number could be obtained,
for example, by counting the number of neighbouring
anchors that are within a given maximum distance of each
AN. For simplicity, let us assume that this number of reliable
rings is K , the same for all the ANs. Then, for every
anchor ai (i = 1, 2, . . . ,N) in the neighbourhood of u, and
assuming the RSSI measurements obtained from that anchor
are ordered as in (14), we can determine a “ring number” ri
associated to the UN as follows:
If ρ(ai,u) > ρ(ai, a(1)), then ri = 1;
else, if ρ(ai, a(k−1)) > ρ(ai,u) > ρ(ai, a(k)) for k ∈
{2, 3, . . . ,N − 1}, then ri = k;
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else, ri = N .
Once the ring numbers {ri, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N} are obtained,
we form the set SK of ANs for which the condition ri ≤ K
holds.
ai ∈ SK iﬀ ri ≤ K , i = 1, 2, . . . ,N. (17)
Now, we will use ROCRSSI to obtain an estimation of the
position of the UN, provided that at least we can obtain the
intersection of two rings.
If |SK | ≥ 2, then apply ROCRSSI algorithm using
only ANs in SK .
else, apply ROCRSSI using the original set of ANs
{a1, a2, . . . , aN}.
The advantages of the BAS approach over the original
ROCRSSI are twofold: first, we get a reduction in localization
error because of the exclusion of unreliable measurements,
and second, computational complexity is also reduced
because we only need to apply the grid-scan algorithm to a
subset of the ANs.
3.4. Resilience to Attacks. As it was previously stated, local-
ization of a given node requires the existence of a suﬃcient
number of reference (anchor) nodes whose positions are
known; usually, these ANs report their coordinates to other
nodes by means of some kind of beacon packets. However, in
a hostile environment, some ANs could be compromised by
an attacker so that, for instance, they are forced to transmit
incorrect beaconing references or to manipulate measure-
ments in order to introduce biases in the computations of
their relative distances to other nodes. In such cases, the
localization process by means of conventional approaches
(for instance, the LS algorithm) gives incorrect results, so
that every node within the radio range of a malicious AN is
wrongly positioned.
For range-based approaches, a possible solution to
mitigate the eﬀects of such kind of attacks is to resort
to robust estimation techniques, which are resilient to the
eﬀects of outliers [13–16]. However, most of these algorithms
are quite complex, and so require too many storage and
computational resources to be implemented on most low-
cost and low-power devices.
On the other hand, most range-free localization tech-
niques are intrinsically robust to attacks as long as there are
more well-behaved anchors than malicious in the vicinity of
the UN and provided that these latter nodes do not collude
together to defeat the whole localization procedure. This is
because positioning is usually based on a “majority decision”
taken after considering location information gathered from
neighbour nodes that give “scores” to diﬀerent feasible
positions for the node. Additionally, range-free positioning
techniques can also be extended to actively detect and
counteract fake beacons [17] and to also neutralize more
advanced threats to WSNs such as the wormhole and Sybil
attacks [9].
4. Trust-Aware Routing
4.1. Introduction. To defend against routing attacks, the real-
isation of a trust management system has been extensively
pursued in the literature. Trust is defined as the confidence
of a node A that node B will perform as expected, that is, on
the node’s B cooperation for the accomplishment of a specific
action.
The methods for obtaining trust information and defin-
ing each node’s trustworthiness are referred to as trust
models, and can be classified according to a number of
design options [18]. Trust is evaluated upon a number of
event types that can be recorded and analysed. Each event
type (corresponding to a trust metric) allows the assessment
of a specific node behaviour aspect and consequently the
detection of a specific attack type. For example, each node
A can assess the forwarding behaviour of its neighbour B
by comparing the successfully forwarded packets to the total
number of packets that A sent to B. A systematic failure
reveals a malicious node, denying its routing tasks. Analysing
the collected measurements, either a trust value can be
derived (inmany cases a ratio of successful over failed events)
or distinct trust levels can be distinguished. To improve the
reliability of the trust information and eﬃciently support
mobility, reputation exchange schemes have been proposed
(e.g., [19]). These schemes however increase the resource
consumption while attacks targeting the reputation protocol
itself have already been identified: for example, spreading
wrong information or behaving diﬀerently towards diﬀerent
neighbors, the reputation exchange protocol can be deceived
[20].
Focusing on location-based routing protocols, interest-
ing trust-based enhancements have been proposed in [21–
23]. In all these approaches, a trust management system
based on direct evidence is implemented while a reputa-
tion exchange mechanism has been introduced in [22] as
an optional choice (without any rigorous specification of
the relevant protocol). In this work, multipath routing is
suggested, sacrificing node and network resources for the
transmission of multiple copies of each packet, to increase
the probability of reaching the destination. In [23], an
interesting approach for extending the network lifetime
is proposed, which however consumes significant node
resources, since it requires the derivation of the coverage
area of each neighbor based on Beacon messages and on
exchanging the neighbor lists. In the same work, the packets
travel through nodes exceeding a trust threshold. This choice
introduces the need for selecting an application-dependent
trust threshold and can result in limited connectivity in
case nodes fulfilling this condition do not exist. Finally, the
authors of [21] have investigated and proposed measures for
detecting and defending against flooding attacks at the cost
of implementing a rate-shaper on each sensor node which is
considered a rather costly solution.
In the sequence we will present an innovative trust-
aware routing approach called Ambient Trust Secure Rout-
ing (ATSR) protocol which is based on the geographical
routing principle and incorporates a distributed trust model
which is capable of detecting forwarding, integrity, and
6 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
bad-mouthing attacks while it additionally extends the
network lifetime by considering the neighbours remaining
energy during routing decision making.
4.2. The Distributed Trust Model. For the detection of
routing attacks in a large WSN, we have designed a
fully distributed trust model which mandates that each
node combines direct trust information and indirect trust
information to define the trustworthiness of all its one-hop
distance neighbours. We first present the collection of trust
measurements and how the direct trust values are reached
and then we proceed to the indirect trust information
(reputation) exchange procedure.
One of the most important issues during the trust model
design is to define the set of behaviour aspects/metrics
against which each node is evaluated. On each sensor node,
a trust repository is used to store trust information per
neighbour and trust metric. The monitored trust metrics
include the following.
(i) Packet Forwarding: To detect nodes that deny to
or selectively forward packets, each time a source
node transmits a packet for forwarding, it enters
the promiscuous mode and overhears the wireless
medium to check whether the packet was actually
forwarded by the selected neighbour.
(ii) Network Layer Acknowledgements (ACK): To detect
nodes that collude with other adversaries (which
possibly drop packets) disrupting the network oper-
ation, we suggest that each source node waits for a
network-layer ACK to check whether its message has
successfully reached a higher-layer node (i.e., the base
station).
(iii) Packet Precision: Each time a source node transmits a
packet for forwarding and then overhears the wireless
medium to ensure that the packet was forwarded,
it additionally processes it to check the packet’s
integrity, that is, that no unexpectedmodification has
occurred.
(iv) Reputation Response: To check the sincere execution
of the reputation protocol, each node calculates for
each neighbour the number of reputation responses
received divided by the number of times this neigh-
bour was asked for reputation information. This way,
nodes that do not cooperate in the execution of the
reputation protocol are assigned lower trust values.
(v) Reputation Validation: To protect against wrong
reputations being spread around (bad-mouthing
attacks), each time a node A receives a reputation
response message from node C regarding node B, if
node A is confident about the direct trust value it has
calculated for node B, it compares the received value
(i.e., the reputation provided from node C) with its
own direct trust on node B. If the diﬀerence exceeds
a predefined threshold, then the provided reputation
is considered as “wrong reputation”; otherwise, it
is a “correct reputation” and node C is scored
accordingly.
(vi) Remaining Energy: Systematically selecting a highly
trusted node for forwarding the packets may lead to
the exhaustion of its energy. Additionally, fixed traﬃc
flows are vulnerable to traﬃc analysis attacks. In this
view, we have enriched our trust model with energy
information. In our novel routing protocol, the basic
routing message indicating the node availability and
position (the Beacon message defined in all location-
based routing protocols) is extended to include the
“remaining energy” field of the source node based on
which the energy-knowledge is built.
Coming to the quantification of trust, for each trust
metric m associated with successful/failed interactions, two
counters (2-byte wide) are used to store the number of
successful/failed interactions, respectively. Based on them,
each node i calculates the trust value of each metric m
regarding node j (denoted as T
i, j
m ) by dividing the number of
successfully completed interactions with the number of total
(attempted) interactions of type m between i and j. The six
trust values are then combined in a weighted sum to produce









whereWm stands for the weight of trust metricm.All weights
sum up to 1 so that the total direct trust value ranges from 0
to 1.
The exchange of indirect trust information is important
mainly for newly initialized nodes or recently arrived nodes
(in case of mobility). To trigger the indirect trust exchange
process, each node periodically issues a reputation request
message. A crucial design issue aﬀecting the produced
network load and the consumed node resources is to decide
which nodes should be queried for indirect trust evidence.
In ATSR, we opted for requesting reputation information
from a limited number (four) of neighbors, as a first action
towards limiting the introduced overhead. Inmore detail, the
source node randomly selects one node per quadrant so that
indirect trust information for all its one-hop neighbours is
gathered.
To limit the amount of communicated data (overhead)
and economize resources, since the reputation exchange is
mainly implemented to assist nodes with no or limited
(direct) trust knowledge to reach a more reliable conclusion
for the trustworthiness of nodes they are interested in, a
requested node provides its opinion for its neighbors only
if it is confident about the direct trust value it has calculated.
This is decided upon the so-called confidence factor Ci, jof
node i considering node j, which is calculated based on the
following equation:
Ci, j = noi
noi + 1
, (19)
where noi stands for the Number Of Interactions (noi)
between node i and node j. So, following this novel scheme,
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 7
the requested node scans its trust table and includes in its
reputation response message, the direct trust value it has
calculated for all neighbors corresponding to confidence
factor exceeding a predefined threshold (e.g., above 0.9).
Once node i that transmitted the reputation request
message receives the reputation responses, node i calculates
the Indirect Trust value for node j, ITi, j , by summing up the
received values adopting the relevant direct trust as weight
factors, so that a reputation provided by a highly trusted
node counts more. Finally, the Total Trust (TT) value for a
neighbor j is produced combining direct and indirect trust
values in the following formula:
TTi, j = Ci, j ∗DTi, j +
(
1− Ci, j
)∗I Ti, j , (20)
where Ci, j is the confidence factor described previously. It
is obvious that as the number of interactions (and thus the
confidence factor,C) increases, the direct trust value becomes
more significant than the reputation information.
4.3. The ATSR Routing Cost Function. The combination
of a fully distributed trust management scheme with a
geographical routing approach renders the proposed routing
solution suitable for large-scale WSNs, since scalability is a
dominant feature of all location-based protocols, such as the
Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing-GPSR [24], which rely
on local topology information only. Following this approach,
each node is characterized by its coordinates and packets are
forwarded to the neighbouring node which is the closest to
the destination (based on geographical information). Nodes
only need to announce their coordinates to their one hop
neighbours, through the so-called Beacon messages, which
are not further propagated, hence saving node and network
resource. Furthermore, the routing table maintained in each
node includes only one hop neighbors and its size depends
only on the network density (number of nodes in the
neighborhood) and not on the overall WSN dimensions.
The objective of our protocol is to choose for forwarding
the node that optimizes the following three factors: trust,
proximity to the destination, and remaining energy to
complete its forwarding task. As regards the distance of each
neighbour to the base station, we define the distance metric







where dj is the Euclidean distance of neighbour j to the base
station and D = ∑Nl dl stands for the sum of the distance
of all its N neighbors to the base station, which can be
calculated based on their coordinates and the coordinates of
the base station. Following (21), the shortest distance to the
destination maximizes the value.
The distance metric T
i, j
d and the total trust value (which
has already incorporated the remaining energy value) are
summed up in a weighted manner and are used to calculate
the Routing Function (RFi, j):
RFi, j =Wd ∗Ti, jd +Wt ∗TTi, j , (22)
where Wd and Wt represent the significance of distance and
trust criterion, respectively, with Wd + Wt =1. Based on this
equation, a routing value for each neighbor is calculated and
the node that corresponds to the maximum value is selected
for forwarding the packet as it represents a good candidate
satisfying an integrated set of requirements: trust, energy,
and proximity to the destination.
4.4. Resilience to Attacks. The proposed trust-aware location-
based routing scheme detects and eﬃciently defends against
routing attacks. Due to its location-based operation, nodes
cannot advertise “good” links to the destination and thus
attract traﬃc. It is only the location that counts and
the trustworthiness of this information is ensured by the
implementation of the localization techniques presented in
Section 3. Coming to traﬃc dropping, this selfish behaviour
is detected based on the collections of measurements
regarding the forwarding behaviour of each neighbour. It
is worth stressing that lacking this tool, any location-based
routing protocol suﬀers 100% packet loss for a session, if
just one selfish node exists in the path to the destination
dropping either part or all the received traﬃc. Our algorithm,
based on the incorporated trust model, detects the selfish
nodes and finds alternative paths to the destination as is
shown in Section 5. In more detail, the higher the weight
factor of forwarding is, the sooner the selfish node is
detected. Packet integrity is mainly ensured by encryption
techniques, which however require a significant amount of
node resources. Our approach allows for integrity attack
detections at low implementation cost (as will be shown
in Section 5). Finally, the already known attacks concerning
the indirect trust exchange are mitigated by monitoring and
scoring the neighbours behaviour regarding this operation.
It is worth stressing that the reputation exchange protocol
consumes node and network resources and thus, the support
of mobility can only justify its implementation in state-of-
the-art sensor nodes.
The detection of flooding and link spoofing attacks
requires the implementation of more sophisticated schemes
(e.g., rate controllers and protocol state-machine monitor-
ing) which are not feasible in state-of-the-art nodes. Thus,
we assume that intrusion detection systems implemented on
a subset of network nodes undertake the responsibility of
defending against these attacks. Traﬃc analysis attacks can
be mitigated by realising load balancing techniques. As a first
action, taking into account the neighbours remaining energy
leads to a certain level of load balancing. In general, the trust-
aware routing protocol acts as a first line of defence against
routing attacks leaving the second line to a more complicated
IDS block.
5. Evaluation Results and Testing
5.1. Testing Environment. To evaluate and validate the
designed mechanisms, the localization and trusted routing
algorithms were first modelled and assessed using simulation
tools and then they were implemented and integrated in
the AWISSENET test-bed. The simulation models provided
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Figure 1: Part of the AWISSENET test-bed.
the opportunity of fine-tuning the algorithms and also
of evaluating the performance under extreme conditions
that rarely happen in real test-beds, as for example, the
performance for hundreds or even thousands of nodes.
The AWISSENET test-bed includes thirty IRIS sensor nodes
[25] running TinyOS v2.1. Part of the test bed set up is
shown in Figure 1. An additional test-bed involving 100
nodes is currently undergoing tests. No diﬀerences have been
observed so far.
5.2. Results. In the sequence, we first present results regard-
ing the performance of the two presented blocks (secure
routing and localization module) as diﬀerent performance
metrics apply to each of them and then we discuss the
implementation cost which is considered an important
evaluation parameter.
5.2.1. Results of Localization. We have conducted some sim-
ulations so as to compare both range-based and range-free
techniques in terms of localization accuracy and robustness
and also to show the computational savings that the BAS
approach can provide. The simulated WSN is composed
of 50 ANs plus one UN randomly deployed in a square
room of 20m × 20m. Some of the anchors can be
“malicious” and report their positions to be 40m away from
their actual locations (although they are not able to forge
measurements). For RSS values, we have assumed the log-
normal path loss model (1) with path-loss exponent α = 2.30
and standard deviation σ = 3.92 dB as stated in [5]. In range-
free methods, we have used a square grid of 50× 50 elements,
which implies a spatial resolution of 40 cm in the proposed
environment. For the BAS method, we have fixed a number
of reliable rings per anchor K = 4.
The quality of the position estimation is measured
through statistics of the “location error”, defined as
ε =
√
(x̂ − x)2 + ( ŷ − y)2, (23)
where (x,y) and (x̂, ŷ) are the actual and estimated positions,
respectively. The location error is characterized by its cumu-
lative distribution function (CDF): CDFε(x) = P(ε ≤ x).
Some results are represented in Figure 2, where we can
see that the linearized LS approaches give higher errors when
compared with range-free techniques in this environment
and also are much more sensitive to location attacks. On
the other hand, the MLE method, not surprisingly, gives the
overall best performance, but the optimization (2) requires a
starting point quite near the optimal solution so as to avoid
getting trapped at a local minimum.
Another set of simulations were carried out to show
the computational savings of the BAS approach over the
conventional ROCRSSI. Notice that, by far, the most com-
putationally demanding step in ROCRSSI is the grid-scan
algorithm, whose complexity is proportional to both the
size of the grid and the number of rings. In conventional
ROCRSSI, the number of processed rings is always equal
to the number of anchors in the neighbourhood of the
UN, whereas in ROCRSSI-BAS only a subset of the anchors
(those considered as “most reliable”) are processed, so that
a significant reduction in the number of computations is
expected.
Figure 3 shows the mean number of processed rings
for the same experimental conditions as in the previous
simulations and varying the number of anchors. The most
remarkable thing we can observe is that the complexity
of ROCRSSI-BAS is almost independent of the number of
anchors, as opposed to conventional ROCRSSI that always
requires a number of computations proportional to N.
We have also experimented range-free localization with
real devices. A set of seven IRIS motes [25] were situated at
fixed positions inside a room of approximately 9m × 9m,
so that they acted as anchors. Another IRIS node was the
UN, and collected RSSI values from the anchors to estimate
its own location using ROCRSSI-BAS. The actual positions
in centimetres of the anchors (referenced to a corner of
the room) were {(440, 520), (520,600), (600,600), (680,560),
(640,440), (520,440), (600, 520)}, while the UN was located
in 46 diﬀerent positions among the anchors. Figure 4 shows
the disposition of the nodes.
The resulting root mean square error (RMSE) of the
position estimation for all the positions is 47 cm, which is
about one half of the minimum separation between anchors.
5.2.2. Results of Secure Routing. The performance of the
proposed ATSR protocol was first assessed through exhaus-
tive simulations using the JSIM open simulation platform.
Simulation tests were run for two topologies consisting of
100 and 1000 nodes, respectively, organised on a symmetric
grid. To debug and monitor the behaviour of the protocol
that was implemented in the IRIS nodes, we developed a
custom software tool, based on the Listen library of TinyOS.
This tool is capable of showing the remaining energy, node
coordinates and ID, as well as the temperature and lighting
indications, the types of messages, the routing path (number
of hops and node id), the neighboring nodes, and the
packet loss indication. The results obtained through this tool































































































Figure 3: Average number of rings processed at the grid-scan phase.
were very close to the results obtained from the simulation
procedure. Minor deviations were attributed to the message
collisions that occurred in the real test-bed environment
which were not taken into account by the routing protocol
in the simulations.
To evaluate the eﬃciency of the proposed ATSR protocol
in detecting malicious nodes issuing grey-hole attacks, we
ran a scenario set for 100 nodes in the network with
malicious nodes randomly dropping the received traﬃc. The
scenarios were tested for three diﬀerent values of the weight
vector; namely, ATSR-1 represents the configuration W1 =
Figure 4: Arrangement of nodes in the localization test.
0.3, W2 = 0.1, W3 = 0.2, W4 = 0.2, W5 = 0.2, and ATSR-
2 mandates W1 = 0.25, W2 = 0, W3 = 0.25, W4 = 0.25,
W5 = 0.25. The results in terms of packet loss are shown
in Figure 5(a), where it is shown that even in the presence
of 45% of malicious nodes in the network, ATSR succeeds
in detecting the malicious nodes and in defining alternative
paths towards the destination with the packet loss remaining
below 5%. (Original GPSR which does not consider the node
trustworthiness suﬀers of 74% packet loss for 45%malicious
nodes in the network.) The same scenarios were also run for
malicious nodes issuing black-hole attacks and the results
were even better since black-hole nodes are more easily
detected because their forwarding trustworthiness drops very
fast. The performance diﬀerence among the two scenarios
(ATSR-1 and ATSR-2) is rather insignificant. Comparing the
W1 and W2 values, which mainly target the detection of the
packet dropping behaviour, for ATSR-1 and 2, we observe
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that the reduction of W2 to zero, brings no performance
deterioration because ATSR is operating on a hop-by-hop
mode.
Malicious nodes that perform integrity attacks altering
either the data messages and/or the control messages do not
cause packet loss but aﬀect the validity of the messages. As
a result, to evaluate the performance of ATSR in avoiding
nodes issuing integrity attacks, we measured the altered
packets that travel in the network. In the scenarios tested
on this purpose, malicious nodes modify the received and
forwarded traﬃc. The results for diﬀerent penetrations of
the malicious nodes are shown in Figure 5(b) where we
also include the number of attacks measured when the
nodes implement the original GPSR routing protocol which
does not take into account trust information. It is worth
stressing that this figure presents the attacks for a fixed
simulation time; in real-life, any non-trust-aware routing
protocol would allow the cooperation with malicious nodes
and the number of altered messages would continuously
increase. Instead, adopting ATSR, the number of attacks does
not increase since the malicious nodes are detected and no
further cooperation with them is attempted. In the same
figure, we have included the number of attacks observed
when malicious nodes act as grey-hole attackers. The grey-
hole attacks measured are higher than the integrity attacks
and this is due to the fact that when a node constantly issues
integrity attacks, its trust-worthiness drops after only a few
interactions, while for grey-hole attackers which randomly
drop packets, it takes few more interactions to reveal the
adversary nodes.
The proposed ATSR protocol eﬃciently detects and
avoids cooperating with nodes providing wrong trust infor-
mation during the executing of the reputation exchange
protocol. To demonstrate this part of the functionality, we
present the relevant results from the AWISSENET test-bed.
The topology considered in this test is shown in Figure 6.
Node 1 transmits packets towards the base station (node 0).
The path initially calculated and followed traverses node 9.
However, node 9 is programmed to act maliciously providing
wrong trust information (i.e., issuing bad-mouthing attack).
Based on the developed tool, we verified that once node 9 is
identified as a bad-mouth attacker from node 4, then node 4
black-lists node 9 and never uses it for forwarding messages.
Due to the random nature of neighbour selection for
asking for reputation information (“round-robin” manner),
the time required for the detection of the malicious node
depends on the frequency of reputation request message
generation. The important conclusion is that once a node
is recognized acting maliciously, then it is excluded from
future interactions. In the presented TOSSIM run, node 9
was revealed after 53 data messages exchange and from this
point on, node 4 selected node 8 as the next-hop neighbour
until other reasons (e.g., remaining energy) caused path
alteration.
5.2.3. Final Results. The presented localization mechanisms
and trusted routing protocol have been successfully inte-
grated in IRIS motes and their proper operation has been
extensively verified. The node resources required for the
Table 1: Node resources required for the implementation of the
trust model and the ATSR block.
Module RAM ROM
ATSR 3,500 35,000
Trust model 1795 3752




Max neighbors GRID X, GRID Y TOSH data length
5361 10 30 60
5981 10 30 80
7221 10 30 120
6061 10 40 60
7006 15 40 60
6306 15 30 60
7301 20 30 60
8121 20 30 80
implementation of the localization and trusted routing
modules are included in Tables 2 and 1.
Coming to the ATSR module, this was successfully com-
piled and required 35Kbytes of ROM and about 3.5 Kbytes
of RAM. Table 1 tabulates the resources required for the
complete ATSR protocol implementation and also includes
the resources required for the trust model alone. It is evident
that the trust model implementation consumes resources
which however represent a small percentage of the overall
trust routing block, proving that the security of the routing
procedure can be improved with limited resources.
When combining the localization and trusted routing
modules, the resources required for the implementation
depend on the network density (which directly aﬀects
the number of one-hop neighbours of each node), the
dimensions of the grid for the range-free localization
algorithm (which aﬀects the precision of the positions),
and the maximum allowable size for the data in a packet
(TOSH DATA LENGTH). Table 2 includes the results for
diﬀerent values of these parameters.
Considering the implementation feasibility one of the
major evaluation parameters, within AWISSENET we have
integrated the protocols presented in this paper with other
modules enhancing security including a distributed Intru-
sion Detection and a secure service discovery block. Our
goal is to shield the WSN against as many attacks as
possible. In this respect, the presented algorithms combined
provide defence against black-hole, sink-hole, any type of
integrity (modification) attack, attacks targeting the trust
model (bad-mouthing, conflicting behaviour) attack, and
Sybil attack while leaving to the intrusion detection system
the responsibility of detecting flooding and higher layers
attacks. It is worth stressing that the eﬃcient defence against
Sybil attack through the implementation of localization
techniques comes at a low cost and obsoletes the need for
GPS equipment while at the same time assists the intrusion













































Figure 5: Performance results in the presence of grey-hole (a) and integrity (b) attackers.
2 7 12 17
3 8 13 18
4 9 14 19
5 10 15 20
6 11 16 21
01
Figure 6: Test-bed topology realised for the evaluation of the ATSR
protocol.
detection system in the identification and localization of the
intruder.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we described innovative lightweight local-
ization techniques that allow for intrusion identification
and isolation schemes and provide accurate location infor-
mation. We presented the way this information is used
by our routing protocol which additionally incorporates a
distributed trust model to prevent several routing attacks to
the network. Both techniques combined can oﬀer a powerful
solution to several attacks in resource wireless constrained
networks such as, WSNs, which has been implemented in
real wireless motes and evaluated and tested extensively
providing promising results based on a reliable and a lower
cost/less scare resources consuming solution for WSNs.
The scientific advances can be summarized in 2 areas:
better and improved precision localization techniques and
secure routing mechanisms.
Focusing on the localization, we implemented range-
free RSSI-based localization techniques which provide a
simple yet eﬀective way to determine a node position
without resorting to expensive equipment or radio interfaces
incompatible with existing WSNs. They also do not require
a previous calibration of the environment so as to directly
correlate RSS measurements to distance values (as range-
based or “fingerprinting” approaches do) and are robust
to attacks to the localization process. On the other hand,
one of their drawbacks is the complexity of the grid-scan
algorithm necessary to estimate the position, which can be
prohibitively high if the density of anchor nodes is high. For
this reason, we have proposed a technique to discard anchors
that provide unreliable positioning information so that both
an improvement in the accuracy in the localization and a
reduction in computational complexity are achieved. The
resulting BAS method has been successfully implemented
and tested on real devices with encouraging results.
Focusing on the secure routing, we proposed and tested
an Ambient Trust Secure Routing (ATSR) protocol which is
based on the geographical routing principle and incorporates
a distributed trust model to defend against routing attacks
which eﬃciently detects and avoids cooperating with nodes
providing wrong trust information during the executing of
the reputation exchange protocol, providing an eﬃcient way
to tackle several attacks.
The results have been demonstrated in the framework of
the project AWISSENET.
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